

Efficiency of Operations at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center, Boston, MA

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 24-153-R25 | December 10, 2024



Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

December 10, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHRISTINE BRISK
NEW ENGLAND DIVISION DIRECTOR, PROCESSING OPERATIONS

TRACY DAMRON
NEW ENGLAND DIVISION DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Joseph E. Wolski", is centered below the memorandum text.

FROM: Joseph E. Wolski
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Efficiency of Operations at the Boston Processing and
Distribution Center, Boston, MA (Report Number 24-153-R25)

This report presents the results of our audit of the Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. Recommendations 3 through 6 should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed. We consider recommendations 1, 2, 7, and 8 closed with issuance of this report.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Monica Brym, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Processing and Distribution Officer and Executive Vice President
Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer and Executive Vice President
Vice President, Processing and Maintenance Operations
Vice President, Logistics
Vice President, Eastern Regional Processing Operations
Atlantic Regional Director, Logistics
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service needs effective and productive operations to fulfill its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and affordable mail service to the American public. It has a vast transportation network that moves mail and equipment among 315 processing facilities and about 31,200 post offices, stations, and branches. The Postal Service is transforming its processing and logistics networks to become more scalable, reliable, visible, efficient, automated, and digitally integrated. This includes modernizing operating plans and aligning the workforce; leveraging emerging technologies to provide world-class visibility and tracking of mail and packages in near real time; and optimizing the surface and air transportation network. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews the efficiency of mail processing operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback to further the Postal Service’s mission.

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of operations at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) in Boston, MA (Project Number 24-153). We judgmentally selected the Boston, MA P&DC based on a review of first and last mile failures;¹ workhours; scanning compliance;² and late, canceled, and extra trips.

The Boston P&DC is in the New England Division and processes letters, flats, and packages. The Boston P&DC services multiple 3-digit ZIP Codes in urban and rural communities³ (see Table 1).

As of September 20, 2024, the Boston P&DC’s employee availability⁴ was 84.8 percent for processing and 91.3 percent for logistics. The Postal Service’s employee availability goal for fiscal year (FY) 2024 was 89 percent for processing and 92.9 percent for logistics.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate the efficiency of operations at the Boston P&DC. To accomplish our objective, we focused on five audit areas: mail clearance times;⁵ delayed mail; late, canceled, and extra outbound trips; dock scanning; and security of registry items. We reviewed Surface Visibility Web (SVWeb)⁶ data for late, canceled, and extra trips, as well as scan compliance for the period from August 1, 2023, to July 31, 2024. Further, we identified mail clearance time goals for the Boston P&DC and compared them with operations shown in the Run Plan Generator report.⁷ During our site visit the week of September 16, 2024, we interviewed P&DC management and observed mail processing and dock operations.

Table 1. Population Demographics

3-Digit ZIP Codes	Urban Population	Rural Population	Total Population
018-019	1,242,055	47,824	1,289,879
021-022	1,446,733	567	1,447,300
024	438,282	614	438,896

Source: Postal Service National Distribution Labeling List and 2020 Census Bureau data.

1 First mile failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Last mile failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at a processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

2 Scans include load, depart, unload, close, assign, and arrive.

3 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.

4 Data that compares straight work hours to the work hours that would have been recorded if all employees reported to work as scheduled.

5 The latest time committed mail can clear an operation for proper dispatch.

6 A website dedicated to the Surface Visibility program, which provides real-time transportation updates and reports on the movement of trailers in the surface network. The data captured to identify early, on-time, late, or canceled trips is also used to evaluate and improve transportation schedules.

7 An application mail processing facilities use to plan machine utilization based on volume, clearance times, and other criteria.

During this time, the OIG also audited three delivery units⁸ serviced by the Boston P&DC. We will provide the results of those audits to Massachusetts-Rhode Island District management in separate reports. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified deficiencies for three of the five areas we reviewed that affected the efficiency of operations at the Boston P&DC. We also identified other issues related to safety (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Issues Identified	
	Yes	No
Clearance Times		X
Delayed Mail	X	
Late, Canceled, and Extra Outbound Trips	X	
Scan Compliance	X	
Security of Registry Items		X
Other Issues	X	

Source: Results of OIG data reviewed from August 1, 2023, to July 31, 2024, and fieldwork conducted from September 16 to September 19, 2024.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Clearance Times – We analyzed mail processing schedules and data to verify the plant was meeting the scheduled clearance times. During our visit, we also observed the timely processing of mail. We did not find any systemic issues.
- Security of Registry Items – We observed registry cage conditions and interviewed personnel to determine if procedures over the handling and security of registered mail were being followed. We did not find any systemic issues.

⁸ The three delivery units were Brookline Branch, Brookline, MA (project number 24-154-1); Fort Point Station, Boston, MA (project number 24-154-2); and Revere Carrier Annex, Revere, MA (project number 24-154-3).

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

We observed delayed mail in the facility on each day from September 17 through 19, 2024. Specifically, we identified mailpieces on the workroom floor, processing machines, and manual letter and flat operations that were delayed or at risk of being delayed. We identified:

- Approximately 2,424 unprocessed collection letters⁹ next to the Advanced Facer and Canceler System (AFCS)¹⁰ on the morning of September 17, 2024. According to management, this mail came from a delivery unit that mixed flats and letters in the same container. The container was sent to the Automated Flats Sorting Machine (AFSM)¹¹ for processing. The letters in the container were not identified and moved to the AFCS machine timely for cancellation that evening. This mail was not reported in the Mail Condition Visualization (MCV) system¹² (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Delayed Letters by the AFCS



Source: OIG photos taken September 17, 2024.

- Approximately 313 letters, including 69 pieces of election mail, left behind on four Delivery Barcode Sorter (DBCS)¹³ machines after operations were completed on September 17 and 19, 2024. The letters identified were a combination of mail that was not properly cleared from the DBCS machines after operations were completed and mail that was processed on the machines but not moved to the docks for timely dispatch. This mail was not reported in the MCV system (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Examples of Delayed Mail Left on DBCS Machines



Source: OIG photos taken September 17 and September 19, 2024.

- Thirty-two packages in the Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) drop off area on September 17, 2024. A placard indicated some of the packages departed another mail processing facility to the Boston P&DC on September 10, 2024. On September 18, 2024, we observed a portion of the same packages from the day before in the HAZMAT drop off area that had not been processed or dispatched. This mail was not reported in the MCV system (see Figure 3).

⁹ OIG estimates based on calculations made using Mail Condition Visualization, Manual *Line-Item Entry Job Aid*, dated October 26, 2020.

¹⁰ Faces and cancels collection mail and reads barcodes.

¹¹ A fully automated machine that processes flat-size mail.

¹² Mail Condition Visualization provides near real-time visibility of a facility's on-hand volume, delayed processing volume, delayed dispatch volume, and oldest mail date by mail category and processing operation and stores historical trailer information.

¹³ An automated letter sorting machine that is used for letter-size mail.

Figure 3. Examples of Delayed Packages in the HAZMAT Drop Off Area



Source: OIG photos taken September 17, 2024.

In addition, we observed approximately 19,300 letters and 12,300 flats in the manual letter and flat operations from September 17 through 19, 2024. This mail was reported in MCV as On-Hand.¹⁴ The mail reported as On-Hand included Postal Automated Redirection System mail,¹⁵ mail rejected from machines, and non-machinable mail.¹⁶ We determined that a portion of mail rejected from the machines and non-machinable mail should have been recorded as Delayed Inventory¹⁷ because this mail would not meet the service standard.¹⁸ The delayed letters we observed had dates as far back as August 30, 2024.

Plant management reported delayed mail in the MCV system on each day of our observations. This did not include mailpieces we identified by the AFCS machine, left behind on the DBCS machines, and in the HAZMAT drop off area. It also did not include mailpieces we found in the manual letter and flat operations that were reported incorrectly

as On-Hand. In total, management reported 19,075 delayed mailpieces in the MCV system during our visit (see Table 3).

In addition, we identified poor placarding practices¹⁹ at the Boston P&DC. Specifically, we observed numerous containers without placards throughout the workroom floor. We were unable to determine if this mail was delayed due to the missing placards.

Why Did it Occur

The delayed mail was primarily due to a lack of management oversight. For example, supervisor and managers did not verify that the letters found in a container at the AFSM were sent to the AFCS for timely cancelation of the mail that evening. In addition, supervisors did not verify that employees swept processing machines for mailpieces left behind after sorting operations were complete or ensure processed mail was dispatched timely.

¹⁴ On-hand pieces include pieces scanned at the facility and pieces nested to containers that arrived at the facility. Pieces are removed from on-hand counts when they complete their final processing operation in that facility or receive a scan at a different processing facility.

¹⁵ Postal Automated Redirection System can intercept mail identified as undeliverable-as-addressed during processing.

¹⁶ Mail that cannot be run on letter sorting machines because of incompatible size, shape, or distortion.

¹⁷ Mail that is not processed in time for its next operation.

¹⁸ Service standards are delivery benchmarks for how long USPS customers can expect it to take to deliver different types of mail and packages from origin to destination.

¹⁹ A mail transportation equipment labeler placard is attached to mailpiece containers and contains route, trip, and destination information.

Regarding the HAZMAT mail, plant management stated the P&DC did not have enough trained employees to handle HAZMAT mailpieces. It also did not know how to report delayed HAZMAT mailpieces in the MCV system. In addition, management did not report the letters and flats that were committed for delivery that day as Delayed Inventory due to an incorrect understanding of the categories in the MCV system.

Additionally, plant management did not provide oversight to ensure all mail containers had a placard at the facility. Management acknowledged that containers of mail arriving from other processing facilities did not always have a placard. However, management has not communicated with those facilities about this issue.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy²⁰ states that managers should continually gauge how well they are managing the flow of mail and have managerial control over the workload, personnel, and equipment needed for a well-run operation. As part of Postal Service practice, a delayed-mail count should be performed and accurately reported in the MCV system daily.²¹ This practice indicates that mail not processed in time for the next operation should be reported as delayed inventory mail. Additionally, managers should use the Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality system²² to communicate and resolve issues from other processing and delivery facilities. Postal Service policy²³ also addresses the importance of accurately placarding mail, as placard information is used throughout the mailstream to ensure timely processing.

Table 3. Reported Delayed Mail

Date	Delayed Letters	Delayed Flats	Delayed Packages	Total Reported in MCV
September 17	0	0	1,020	1,020
September 18	15,000	0	1,026	16,026
September 19	0	0	2,029	2,029

Source: The MCV system.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is not processed properly, there is an increased likelihood of delays. When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. Inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the MCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues. In addition, incorrect or incomplete labels on mail as it moves through a processing facility make it difficult to manage

the mailflow and correctly prioritize the processing of mail.

Management Actions

In response to our observations regarding delayed mail found by the AFCS machine, plant management provided documentation showing it established a process for moving all comingled letter mail from the AFSM operation back to the AFCS machine in time for cancelation process.

²⁰ Handbook PO-413, *Platform Operations*, Sections 2-1 and 2-4.4, dated December 2013.

²¹ MCV Manual Line Item Entry Job Aid.

²² The Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality is a centralized system for plants and delivery offices to report on variances from agreed upon mail arrival profiles.

²³ Handbook PO-441, *Rehandling of Mail Best Practices*, Section 4-B.1, dated April 2002.

Recommendation #1

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify the machines are properly cleared of mail at the end of each operational run and mail is timely dispatched, at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

Recommendation #2

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify enough employees are trained and available to process Hazardous Material mail timely at Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

Recommendation #3

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify delayed mail counts are completed and entered correctly into the Mail Condition Visualization system.

Recommendation #4

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations**, use the Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality system to communicate and resolve issues with placarding from processing facilities.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service generally agreed with this finding and the associated recommendations. Regarding recommendation 1, management stated standard work instructions (SWI)

and stand-up talks (SUT) were provided to employees on proper procedures for properly clearing machines. Management also stated it will continue to ensure timely dispatch of mail and monitoring for compliance. For recommendation 2, management stated SWIs and SUTs were provided to employees on proper procedures for processing HAZMAT mail, and it will ensure that the HAZMAT operation is properly staffed and monitored for compliance. Management requested to close these two recommendations upon issuance of the final report. For recommendation 3, management stated it will monitor MCV usage to ensure delayed mail counts are completed and entered correctly daily. The target implementation date is January 31, 2025. For recommendation 4, management stated it will reiterate the requirement to use the MAQ/PAQ system to communicate issues with placarding and record resolutions. The target implementation date is February 28, 2025. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations. The Postal Service provided documentation supporting the closure of recommendations 1 and 2. Based on our review of the support provided, we considered recommendations 1 and 2 closed upon issuance of this report.

Finding #2: Late, Canceled, and Extra Trips

What We Found

From August 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024, there was a total of 117,144 outbound trips from the Boston P&DC. Of the total outbound trips, there were 23,457 (20 percent) late trips, 5,210 (4.4 percent) canceled trips, and 1,926 (1.7 percent) extra trips at the Boston P&DC. The late, canceled, and extra trips represent about 26.1 percent of all outbound trips at the facility (see Table 4).

Table 4. Outbound Transportation Metrics

Transportation Metric	Number	Percentage of Total Outbound Trips
Late Trips	23,457	20 %
Canceled Trips	5,210	4.4%
Extra Trips	1,926	1.7%

Source: SVWeb.

We did not identify systemic issues with canceled and extra trips.

Why Did it Occur

According to the SVWeb data, the top two reasons for late outbound trips at the Boston P&DC were traffic and late inbound Postal Vehicle Service (PVS).²⁴ Logistics management indicated that traffic is an issue in the Boston area; however, travel time has not been reassessed to include the increased travel time due to traffic congestion. Also, according to the Workforce Planning system,²⁵ a full transportation schedule review for the Boston P&DC was last conducted in FY 2021.

In addition, management attributed late inbound PVS trips to inoperable dock doors at the Boston P&DC. Management stated inoperable dock doors have been an ongoing issue. For example, in the last fiscal year, from October 2023 through September 2024, the Boston P&DC reported 22 dock door issues in the Electronic Facilities Management System (eFMS).²⁶ During our visit, 13 out of 89 dock doors we observed were inoperable, which limited the

number of functional dock doors for inbound trucks arriving at the same time to move the mail in a timely manner. As of September 20, 2024, there were 12 active workorders in eFMS for dock door repairs at the Boston P&DC. Management is also training a new employee to provide on-site assistance with dock door repairs. Therefore, we are not making a recommendation on issues related to the dock doors.

What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,²⁷ key elements to effective dispatch and routing include evaluating transportation performance to planned schedules and ensuring that planned dispatches are compatible with an effective mail arrival profile at the destination.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there are late trips, there is an increased risk the mail will not be delivered on time, which can adversely affect Postal Service customers, harm the brand, send mailers to competitors, increase operating costs, and cause the Postal Service to lose revenue.

Recommendation #5

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Logistics**, complete a review of Postal Vehicle Service transportation schedules and verify related actions are implemented at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service generally agreed with this finding and the associated recommendation. Management stated it will complete a review of PVS schedules and a zero-base study to adjust transportation schedules to meet transportation needs. The target implementation date is May 31, 2025.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management’s comment responsive to the recommendation.

24 A service Postal Service employees use to transport mail between mail processing facilities, post offices, post office branches, post office stations, detached mail units, various postal customers, and terminals.
25 Workforce Planning is a centralized hub that links to staff planning, insights, and analytics.
26 The eFMS program is the official USPS record for real property inventory and the management system for administering all property related projects.
27 Handbook M-22, *Dispatch and Routing Policies*, Section 116, dated July 2013.

Finding #3: Scan Compliance

What We Found

The Boston P&DC did not consistently meet load and unload scan²⁸ goals. From August 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024, the average compliance at the Boston P&DC for load scans was 83.5 percent and for unload scans was 88.7 percent (see Figure 4). The Postal Service goal for scanning compliance was 92 percent in FY 2023 and 93.25 percent in FY 2024. Additionally, during the week of September 16, 2024, we observed load scans were not always performed.

Figure 4. Scanning Compliance at the Boston P&DC



Why Did it Occur

Plant management attributed the inconsistent load and unload scanning to a lack of management oversight, employee training, and access to available scanners. The plant manager acknowledged that supervisors are not always monitoring dock operations to verify load and unload scans are consistently completed. He stated that several supervisors have been given disciplinary actions

for not properly monitoring scanning. Management stated that some employees required training because they do not know how to scan properly. In addition, management stated employees often do not return scanners at the end of their tours. Plant management stated that the P&DC has enough scanners, and it is in the process of moving scanners to the registry cage, which would give it more control and accountability over the scanners. Management developed a plan in May 2024 to improve scanning performance but indicated it will take time to implement the actions in the plan and change employee behaviors.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy²⁹ states that employees are required to perform outbound and inbound scans of containers and trailers to ensure 100 percent mail visibility.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Low scanning compliance contributes to inaccurate utilization data, missent mail, and operational inefficiencies. Management uses scanning data to streamline outbound container operations, enhance dispatch quality, and increase efficiency in the use of transportation containers and trailers. When scans are not made, management may not have the information needed to make accurate operational decisions.

Recommendation #6

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations** and **New England Division Director, Logistics**, meet load and unload scan goals consistently at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

²⁸ Load scans are performed when a container is loaded onto a trailer for dispatch and unload scans are performed when a container is removed from a trailer.

²⁹ Surface Visibility Program User booklet, updated January 10, 2023.

Recommendation #7

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations** and **New England Division Director, Logistics**, provide training to employees on proper scanning and verify supervisors are monitoring dock operations for scanning at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

Recommendation #8

We recommend the **New England Division Director, Processing Operations** and **New England Division Director, Logistics**, establish and enforce an accountability process for scanners at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service generally agreed with this finding and the associated recommendations. Regarding recommendation 6, management stated it conducted an SUT on proper scanning procedures and shared the SWIs with all employees with scanning responsibilities. In addition, management will conduct reviews to

monitor for compliance and consistency. The target implementation date is July 31, 2025. Regarding recommendation 7, management stated it conducted an SUT on proper scanning procedures and shared the SWIs with all employees with scanning responsibilities. The target implementation date is February 28, 2025. Regarding recommendation 8, management stated it developed action and training plans and implemented a sign-out sheet to enforce scanner accountability. In addition, management contracted a supplier to complete work to the registry cage to better secure scanners. The target implementation date is April 30, 2025.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations. The Postal Service provided documentation supporting the closure of recommendations 7 and 8. Based on our review of the support provided, the OIG agreed to close recommendations 7 and 8 upon issuance of this report.

Finding #4: Safety

What We Found

During our site observations, we observed several safety issues. Specifically, we observed the following:

- Two trucks and trailers parked at the docks without wheel chocks placed next to the tire to prevent them from rolling away (see Figure 5).
- A damaged concrete expansion joint on the first floor (see Figure 6).
- An uneven and damaged section of the workroom floor in a high traffic area (see Figure 7).

Figure 5. Truck and Trailer Without Wheels Chocked



Source: OIG photos taken September 18, 2024.

Figure 6. Repairs in Progress on Damaged Concrete Expansion Joint



Source: OIG photo taken September 19, 2024.

Figure 7. Uneven Section of Workroom Floor



Source: OIG photo taken September 17, 2024.

Why Did it Occur

Employees at the Boston P&DC did not consistently follow safety rules to properly secure trucks and trailers at the docks. In addition, management was aware of the damaged concrete expansion joint and workroom floor and had reported both issues in eFMS prior to our visit. According to plant management, the damaged concrete expansion joint had been repaired by a contractor three times prior to our visit. On September 18, 2024, the day after our discussion regarding this matter with the maintenance manager, the contractor arrived to repair the damaged concrete expansion joint. Additionally, the contractor also temporarily patched the uneven section of the workroom floor until a more permanent repair is made. Therefore, we are not making a recommendation on the damaged expansion joint or workroom floor issues.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy³⁰ states that drivers must prevent trailers from rolling away from docks by using wheel chocks. In addition, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires employers to provide a safe and healthy workplace free of recognized hazards.³¹

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When employees do not observe safe working practices and safety rules, there is an increased risk of employee accidents and injuries.

Management Actions

In response to our observations, plant management conducted training with employees on the need to use wheel chocks. Therefore, we will not be making a recommendation regarding this matter.

³⁰ Handbook EL-803, *Maintenance Employee's Guide to Safety*, Section 1, subsection C dated July 2020.

³¹ OSHA Act of 1970.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from September through December 2024, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on November 25, 2024, and included their comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the mail processing operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of the MCV system and SVWeb data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



December 3, 2024

JOHN CIHOTA
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: *Efficiency of Operations at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center, Boston, MA* (Report Number 24-153-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report *Efficiency of Operations at the Boston Processing and Distribution Center*.

Management generally agrees with the findings on delayed mail; late, canceled, and extra trips; and scan compliance. Following are our comments on each of the eight recommendations.

Recommendation 1: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations, verify the machines are properly cleared of mail at the end of each operational run and mail is timely dispatched, at the Boston P&DC.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Standard Work Instructions (SWIs) and Stand-Up Talks (SUTs) were given to employees on proper procedures for properly clearing machines. Management will continue to ensure timely dispatch of mail and monitoring for compliance. Management requests to close this recommendation upon issuance of the final report.

Target Implementation Date: N/A

Responsible Official: N/A

Recommendation 2: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations, verify enough employees are trained and available to process Hazardous Material mail timely at Boston P&DC.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. SWIs and SUTs were given to employees on proper procedures for processing HAZMAT mail. Management will continue to ensure that the HAZMAT operation is properly staffed and monitored for compliance. Management requests to close this recommendation upon issuance of the final report.

Target Implementation Date: N/A

Responsible Official: N/A

Recommendation 3: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations, verify delayed mail counts are completed and entered correctly into the Mail Condition Visualization system (MCV).

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Management will monitor MCV usage to ensure delayed mail counts are completed and entered correctly daily.

Target Implementation Date: 01/31/2025

Responsible Official: Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 4: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations, use the Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality (MAQ/PAQ) system to communicate and resolve issues with placarding from processing facilities.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Management will reiterate the requirement to use the MAQ/PAQ system to communicate issues with placarding and record resolutions.

Target Implementation Date: 02/28/2025

Responsible Official: Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 5: We recommend the New England Division Director, Logistics, complete a review of Postal Vehicle Service (PVS) transportation schedules and verify related actions are implemented at the Boston P&DC.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Logistics will complete a review of PVS schedules and a Zero-Base Study to adjust transportation schedules to ensure the Boston P&DC continues to meet transportation needs.

Target Implementation Date: 05/31/2025

Responsible Official: Division Director, Logistics

Recommendation 6: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations and New England Division Director, Logistics, meet load and unload scan goals consistently at the Boston P&DC.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Management conducted a stand-up talk on proper scanning procedures and shared the SWIs with all employees with scanning responsibilities. Additionally, management will conduct reviews to monitor for compliance and consistency.

Target Implementation Date: 07/31/2025

Responsible Official: Division Director, Processing Operations
Division Director, Logistics

Recommendation 7: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations and New England Division Director, Logistics, provide training to employees on proper scanning and verify supervisors are monitoring dock operations for scanning at the Boston P&DC.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Management conducted a SUT on proper scanning procedures and shared the SWIs with all employees with scanning responsibilities. Additionally, management will conduct reviews to monitor for compliance and consistency.

Target Implementation Date: 02/28/2025

Responsible Official: Division Director, Processing Operations
Division Director, Logistics

Recommendation 8: We recommend the New England Division Director, Processing Operations and New England Division Director, Logistics, establish and enforce an accountability process for scanners at the Boston P&DC.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Management developed action and training plans. Management also implemented a sign out sheet to enforce scanner accountability. Furthermore, management contracted a supplier to complete work to the registry cage to better secure scanners. Management requests to close this recommendation upon issuance of the final report.

Target Implementation Date: 04/30/2025

Responsible Official: Division Director, Processing Operations
Division Director, Logistics

E-SIGNED by CHRISTINE.E BRISK
on 2024-12-03 20:43:42 EST

Christine Brisk
New England Division Director, Processing Operations

E-SIGNED by Tracy.L Damron
on 2024-12-03 17:43:19 EST

Tracy Damron
New England Division Director, Logistics

cc: Vice President, Regional Processing Operations (Eastern)
Corporate Audit Response Management

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