

August 23, 2001

SUZANNE F. MEDVIDOVICH  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, HUMAN RESOURCES

SUBJECT: Audit Report - National Capping Report on the Postal Service Violence Prevention and Response Programs (Report Number LB-AR-01-020)

This report summarizes the results of audits performed by a contractor and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to assess the Postal Service violence prevention and response programs in 25 districts (Project Number 01JA001LB000). More specifically, this report summarizes the conditions found in the 25 districts and focuses on management's actions taken or planned as corrective actions to correct the issues identified and implement recommendations made in our reports.

On the basis of these audits, we concluded that none of the 25 districts fully implemented required controls to reduce the potential for violence. We found that each of the districts generally followed the Threat Assessment Team Guide when reacting to incidents of violence, but did not fully implement strategies to prevent violence. However, 15 of the 25 districts did not fully implement the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace. District officials stated they did not follow many of the strategies because either they were not aware of requirements included in the guides or believed the guides were not mandatory, or applicable to all situations in their district. Postal Service Headquarters management stated that no one should view critical programs as optional and agreed to clarify the mandatory aspects of the guide. We concluded that districts not fully following these guidelines might not be as effective in preventing violence.

Each of the 25 reports included recommendations to district officials and area vice presidents for corrective action. While district and area managers generally disagreed with some of the findings in the reports, they all provided corrective actions taken or planned which we considered responsive to the recommendations we made. In addition, an Office of Employee Resource Management official informed us that they are establishing cross-functional teams to develop specific tasks for improving the violence prevention and response programs, and plan to revise the Threat Assessment Team Guide.

This report does not contain recommendations. However, management provided a response, which included an update on progress made on initiatives to improve the Postal Service violence prevention and response programs. Management's comments are included, in their entirety, in Appendix B to this report.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact Joyce Hansen, acting deputy assistant inspector general, Oversight and Business Evaluation, or me at (703) 248-2300.

Ronald K. Stith  
Assistant Inspector General  
for Oversight and Business Evaluations

Attachment

cc: Willaim A. Campbell  
Anthony J. Vegilante  
John R. Gunnels

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b>	i
<b>Part I</b>	
<b>Introduction</b>	
Background	1
Objective, Scope, and Methodology	2
Prior Audit Coverage	3
<b>Part II</b>	
<b>Audit Results</b>	
Potential for Violence in the Districts	4
Physical Security Reviews	5
Climate Indicators	6
Threat Assessment Team Orientation	7
Case Management	8
Measurement of Threat Assessment Team Performance	9
Violence Awareness Training	10
Crisis Management Plans	11
Corrective Actions by Management at Postal Service Headquarters	11
<b>Appendix A. Audit Reports</b>	13
<b>Appendix B. Management's Comments</b>	15

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

### Introduction

This report summarizes the results of audits performed by a contractor and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to review the Postal Service's violence prevention and response programs in 25 districts. More specifically, this report summarizes the conditions found in the 25 districts and focuses on management's actions taken or planned to correct the issues identified and implement recommendations made in our reports. Our overall objective was to determine whether the 25 districts implemented Postal Service's policies regarding violence prevention and response programs.

---

### Results in Brief

While we found that each of the districts generally complied with some of the strategies outlined in the Threat Assessment Team Guide, when reacting to incidents of violence, none of the 25 districts fully implemented strategies to prevent violence from occurring. Furthermore, 15 of the 25 districts did not fully follow the procedures outlined in the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace. District officials generally indicated they did not follow many of the procedures because they were not aware of the guides' requirements or believed the guides were not mandatory or applicable to all situations in their districts. Postal Service Headquarters management stated that no one should view critical programs as optional and agreed to clarify the mandatory aspects of the guide.

As a result, we believe that districts not fully following these guidelines may not be as effective in preventing violence at their facilities. We noted that violence could increase stress and lower employee morale. Organizationally, it can diminish credibility, decrease productivity, and may lead to damage of property.

We recommended that all districts implement controls to improve the effectiveness of their violence prevention and response programs. To address the OIG's recommendations, area vice presidents and district managers outlined their planned and implemented actions to make improvements in districts' violence prevention and response programs. We considered these actions responsive to our recommendations and we have noted

examples of their actions in the appropriate sections in this report. For example, districts acted on our recommendations by:

- Conducting the required annual security reviews.
- Implementing procedures to proactively monitor and evaluate climate indicators.
- Providing 2-day orientation training to all threat assessment team members.
- Implementing procedures to ensure appropriate case management.
- Establishing threat assessment team performance measures.
- Providing required violence awareness training.
- Ensuring the customized crisis management plans were on site at district facilities.

Additionally, the Office of Employee Resource Management established cross-functional teams to improve violence prevention and response programs, including revising the Threat Assessment Team Guide or developing a comprehensive supplement that identified the required elements of the violence prevention and response programs that must be followed. The acting vice president of Employee Resource Management stated this will ensure consistent program implementation, allow districts flexibility for certain situations, and establish accountability for managers responsible for threat assessment and crisis management teams. Accordingly, this report does not contain additional recommendations requiring management response.

---

**Summary of  
Management's  
Comments**

The senior vice president, Human Resources, provided a response, which included an update on progress made on initiatives to improve the Postal Service violence prevention and response program, in the areas of guidance, training, and physical security reviews. Specifically, management stated that changes to the program guide were made to emphasize mandatory elements of the program.

Additionally, management noted that efforts were completed to ensure that threat assessment team members received workplace environment improvement training and the Inspection Service continued their efforts to address accountability for security reviews. The response is included, in its entirety, in Appendix B of this report.

---

**Overall Evaluation of  
Management's  
Comments**

Management's comments were responsive to our report.

## INTRODUCTION

---

### Background

The Postal Service recognizes the importance of ensuring the safety of its employees by creating and maintaining a work environment that is violence-free. This concept emphasizes using a viable workplace violence prevention program as a first step in helping to ensure a violence-free workplace. An effective program depends on a universal zero tolerance policy and plan that is consistently implemented for the management of threats, assaults, and other inappropriate workplace behavior.

The Postal Service established the following initiatives and strategies to prevent and minimize the potential risk for violence in the workplace:

- The Joint Statement on Violence and Behavior in the Workplace states that it is the Postal Service's position that violent and inappropriate behavior will not be tolerated by anyone at any level of the Postal Service.
- The Threat Assessment Team Guide, Publication 108, and the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace, Publication 107,<sup>1</sup> require districts to develop appropriate threat assessment and crisis management teams, as well as team plans of operation.
- The Administrative Support Manual requires security control officers or their designees to conduct annual physical security reviews at all facilities.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) engaged Williams, Adley & Company, LLP to assist in conducting these audits and reporting on violence prevention and response efforts within 25 Postal Service districts. The OIG provided technical support, statistical projections, and quality assurance reviews. This report summarizes the conditions found in the 25 districts and focuses on management's actions taken or planned to address the issues identified and implement recommendations made in our report.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace is currently under revision.

---

**Objective, Scope, and Methodology**

Our overall objective was to determine whether the 25 districts selected implemented Postal Service policies regarding violence prevention and response programs. This report summarizes the conditions found in the 25 districts and focuses on management's actions taken or planned to address the issues and recommendations.

The OIG and its contractor reviewed applicable laws, policies, procedures, climate assessments, and other documents, such as the Postal Inspection Service's Assault and Threat Incident Reports and investigative worksheets. We also reviewed United States General Accounting Office (GAO) reports related to labor-management issues.

The OIG randomly selected 25 districts located in the Postal Service's Mid Atlantic, Pacific, Southeast, and Western Areas. (See Appendix A). Williams, Adley & Company, LLP, conducted audits of 19 districts and OIG conducted the audits of the remaining 6 districts. The OIG provided technical support, statistical projections, and quality assurance reviews for the audit work performed by Williams, Adley & Company, LLP.

The OIG or the contractor interviewed Postal Service officials in each of the 25 districts, four area offices, and headquarters to obtain information about the Postal Service workplace environment, and the policies and procedures implemented to ensure a safe and violence-free workplace. The OIG also interviewed an Employee Resource Management official to obtain information on planned and implemented improvements to the programs.

These audits were conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The contractor conducted these audits in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Government Auditing Standards utilizing procedures agreed to by the OIG. Additionally, we included tests of internal controls as were considered necessary under the circumstances. The OIG and the contractor discussed the conclusions and observations with appropriate management officials and included their comments, where appropriate.

---

**Prior Audit Coverage**

This audit was self initiated based on results found in OIG reviews of violence prevention and response programs in the Milwaukee and Suncoast Districts, and the evaluation of the Postal Service criteria for workplace violence prevention and response programs.

In the two district reviews, OIG found that the districts did not follow many of the violence prevention policies and procedures outlined in the Threat Assessment Guide. OIG considered management's planned or implemented actions responsive to the specific issues identified in the report.

The OIG's evaluation of Postal Service criteria, revealed that the violence prevention and response criteria are adequate to assist management in the implementation of programs, reduce the risk of violence in the workplace, and effectively respond to work disruptions from incidents of violence in the workplace. However, we noted that the Postal Service needed to include language in the violence prevention and response program criteria to ensure full compliance with the criteria. Management generally agreed with the reports' findings and recommendations and stated that clarification of critical portions of the guide was needed to ensure that no one viewed critical programs as optional.

## AUDIT RESULTS

---

### **Potential for Violence in the Districts**

On the basis of our audits, we concluded that none of the 25 districts fully implemented required controls to reduce the potential for violence. While each of the districts generally complied with the Threat Assessment Team Guide when reacting to incidents of violence, they did not fully implement strategies to prevent violence. Furthermore, 15 of the 25 districts did not fully comply with the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace.

Generally, each of the 25 districts:

- Established a threat assessment team.
- Developed and communicated a zero tolerance policy.
- Developed an action plan to manage threats.

However, the reviews disclosed that of the 25 districts:

- Eighteen did not conduct annual physical security reviews at all district facilities.
- Twenty-five did not proactively monitor and evaluate climate indicators.
- Thirteen did not provide the required 2-day orientation training for all threat assessment team members.
- Twenty did not fully engage in case management.
- Twelve did not fully document case management efforts.
- Twenty-four did not measure team performance.
- Twenty-five did not mandate violence awareness training.
- Fifteen did not ensure that a local, customized crisis management plan was on site at all district facilities.

District officials generally stated they did not follow many of the policies and procedures because they were not aware of the guides' recommendations or believed the guides were not applicable to all situations in their district. We concluded that

districts not fully implementing these guidelines were not as prepared to prevent incidents of violence. We noted that violence could increase stress and lower employee morale. Organizationally, it can diminish credibility, decrease productivity, and may lead to damage of property.

Regarding the differences in interpretation of the Threat Assessment Team Guide, the OIG viewed the publication as mandatory based on the importance of the guidance it provides, particularly in the areas of violence prevention. In addition, when responding to a 1998 OIG audit report, which recommended the full implementation of the policies and procedures outlined in the guide, at one Postal Service district, Postal Service Headquarters management agreed with the recommendation and provided headquarters personnel to assist the district in the implementation.<sup>2</sup>

We recommended that districts implement controls to improve the effectiveness of the districts' violence prevention and response programs. To address OIG's recommendations, area vice presidents, and district managers outlined their planned and implemented actions to make improvements in districts' violence prevention and response programs. We have noted their actions in the appropriate sections in this report.

In addition, the Office of Employee Resource Management established cross-functional teams to develop tasks to make improvements in the violence prevention and response programs and the workplace environment.

---

Physical Security  
Reviews

We found that 18 districts did not conduct annual physical security reviews in all facilities. The Postal Service Administrative Support Manual, Chapter 2, Section 27, requires the security control officer or a designee to conduct annual physical security reviews at all Postal Service facilities to ensure that the appropriate attention is given to security issues.<sup>3</sup> District officials stated that they did not perform physical security reviews in all facilities because they were unaware of the requirement to perform the reviews or that they conducted the reviews, but did not maintain adequate documentation to support them. The lack of physical security reviews at Postal

---

<sup>2</sup> Violence Prevention Policies and Procedures, Milwaukee District Compliance, September 30, 1998, (Report Number LM-AR-98-002.)

<sup>3</sup> The chief postal inspector is designated as the security officer for the Postal Service. The security control officers located at each Postal Service facility liaison with the Postal Inspection Service on all security matters.

Service facilities may allow the loss or destruction of Postal Service property and the mail to go undetected.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. For example, in a January 2001 memorandum to district managers in the Western Area, the Western Area vice president, directed security control officers to conduct physical security reviews and maintain supporting documentation to support the reviews. The Spokane District manager stated that physical security reviews were completed in June 1999 for larger offices with 26 or more employees. The Portland District formed a physical security control team and subsequently conducted the reviews for fiscal year (FY) 1999 and 2000. In February 2001, the acting vice president, Employee Resource Management informed OIG that a cross-functional team is also reviewing facility security issues.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Climate Indicators

We found that none of the 25 districts proactively monitored and evaluated climate indicators to identify and follow-up on events that could escalate the potential for violence because district officials were not aware of the requirement. As a result, controls associated with identifying and assessing indicators were not used to reduce the potential for violence in the workplace.

The Threat Assessment Team Guide outlines several climate indicators that are relevant for review when making such determinations. Among those indicators are grievances, Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, referrals to the Employee Assistance Program, and labor-management relationships.<sup>4</sup> The districts could improve their process for evaluating workplace climates by proactively identifying and monitoring work environments that have the potential for violence. Reviewing and evaluating the climate indicators mentioned above on a periodic basis could provide valuable information about conflict in district facilities.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. Specifically, the Pacific Area Human Resources manager

---

<sup>4</sup> We considered the results of the Voice of the Employee survey as an indicator of labor-management relationships.

informed OIG in September 2000 that climate assessments were conducted to improve the workplace climate. The area office would provide districts with updated climate indicator data every accounting period. The San Jose District manager noted that the performance cluster would use Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, sick leave usage, and the Voice of the Employee Survey to monitor and evaluate the climate. Also, the Santa Ana District manager told the OIG that the climate indicator data provided to the employee and workplace intervention analyst every accounting period would be made available to the threat assessment team members for review at each meeting.

According to the acting vice president, Employee Resource Management, a cross-functional team is currently reviewing the workplace climate indicators to determine what data should be provided to the threat assessment teams to assist in monitoring workplace climates in facilities.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Threat Assessment  
Team Orientation

We found that 13 of the 25 districts did not provide the 2-day orientation training for all threat assessment team core members as required in the Threat Assessment Team Guide. Many reasons were given for not providing the orientation training such as conflicting schedules that prevented attendance at orientation and not having a process in place to ensure training for new members. A threat assessment team that is not adequately trained cannot be effective in establishing a violence prevention and response program that will reduce the risk of violence in the workplace.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. For example, in a September 2000 memorandum, the Southeast Area vice president directed district managers to assure that all threat assessment team members received the required 2-day orientation. The North Florida District manager informed OIG that all threat assessment team members would receive the 2001 threat assessment orientation by accounting period 2 of FY 2001. In addition, the South Georgia District manager committed to provide the orientation to all threat assessment team members by October 2000.

According to the acting vice president, Employee Resource Management, the threat assessment team orientation is critical to each team member functioning in his or her role on the team. She stated that headquarters personnel could assist the teams in getting their team members trained.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Case Management

Of the 25 districts, 20 did not fully engage in case management of all threats that occurred within their district during the review period, June 1, 1997, through June 30, 1999, as required by the Threat Assessment Team Guide. District officials provided various reasons for not engaging in case management such as they expected supervisors and facility managers to monitor reported threats and/or they were not aware of the requirements in the guide. A district that does not fully identify and investigate all threats and follow up on risk abatement plans could contribute to an unsafe workplace for employees.

The Threat Assessment Team Guide requires the threat assessment team to engage in case management of all threats, including assessing the risks posed by the overall circumstances of a threat, developing a risk abatement plan, and engaging in follow up. Although the guide recommends that documentation be kept to a minimum, it lists certain information that must be documented, including: risk assessment findings on each case discussed, risk priority ratings assigned, and risk abatement actions.

These 20 threat assessment teams did not engage in case management for all of the employee-on-employee threats investigated by the Postal Inspection Service. Most district officials stated that the Postal Inspection Service did not report all threats to the threat assessment team. Additionally, 12 of these 20 districts did not fully document their case management efforts. That is, district case files were nonexistent or did not include documentation of risk assessment, risk abatement plans, and follow-up results.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. For example, in September 2000, the Mid Atlantic Area vice

president stated that each of the six districts reviewed in his area has some level of case management. He stated, however, the area office would issue guidance to ensure consistent and effective case management of all threats, including assessing risk, developing abatement plans, and performing follow up. The Mississippi District manager stated that the district would modify and enhance its current suspense/tickler file system to better monitor the results of risk abatement plans. The system will be fully implemented on November 15, 2000.

The acting vice president of Employee Resource Management informed OIG that a team is currently reviewing this issue to improve communication with the Postal Inspection Service and the teams to obtain threat data. In addition, the acting vice president stated that another team is reviewing how to assist in developing plans to help teams improve case management.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Measurement of Threat  
Assessment Team  
Performance

We found that 24 districts did not establish threat assessment team performance measures as required by the Threat Assessment Team Guide. District officials told us that their team had been recently established and had not developed performance measures, were reviewing the guide to determine what to measure, or were informally assessing their progress based on the actions taken to defuse situations. Without performance measures, teams could not objectively measure the effect their violence prevention efforts had on the workplace climate and operations.

Performance measures help reduce the risk of violence in the workplace because they provide objective information to management on baseline performance, and measure the effect of the violence prevention program. Objective data can be obtained through the use of surveys, the numbers and types of threats and assaults, a tracking system, and post-incident analysis of each violent incident.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. For example, the Big Sky District management informed OIG that the threat assessment team survey is being utilized to measure team performance. In addition, the Long Beach District told OIG

they used an informal performance evaluation process, but has implemented a standardized evaluation form.

The acting vice president of Employee Resource Management indicated that performance measures are currently being reviewed to develop benchmarks to help teams know if they are operating effectively.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Violence Awareness  
Training

None of the 25 districts provided workplace violence awareness training for district managers, supervisors, and craft employees in accordance with the Threat Assessment Team Guide. Districts officials told us that they did not consider the training mandatory. Employees who have not received violence awareness training may not be effective in preventing violence in the workplace.

The Threat Assessment Team Guide states that every Postal Service manager and supervisor should complete 8 hours of workplace violence awareness training and 4 hours of follow-up training. Training topics should include defusing a difficult situation and providing effective supervision. In September 1998, Postal Service management mandated 1 hour of violence awareness training for craft employees, supervisors, and managers.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. In FY 2000, the Postal Service required 4 hours of workplace environment training for all craft and management employees. Additionally, all craft employees were required to receive 1 hour of workplace violence prevention training. Each area vice president informed OIG that all districts complied with this mandate from Postal Service Headquarters in FY 2000. Furthermore, according to the acting vice president of Employee Resource Management, this training remains as part of the Postal Service's Strategic Focus for FY 2001. The San Jose District began their workplace violence awareness training as part of the new employee orientation in January 2000. In addition, the Honolulu District provided craft employees with the 1-hour violence awareness training and is scheduled to provide the managers with refresher violence training in FY 2001.

The acting vice president of Employee Resource Management indicated that follow-up training might not have occurred because headquarters did not provide guidance and training materials to the districts.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Crisis Management  
Plans

We found that 15 districts did not ensure that a local, customized crisis management plan was on site at all district facilities as required by The Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace. Most officials said they could not locate their copy of the plan or they never received a copy of the plan. Crisis management plans prepare the crisis management team to mobilize and respond effectively to an actual crisis. Officials in district facilities that do not have plans may be unable to take the appropriate action in the event of a crisis.

In response to our recommendations, these districts provided actions taken and planned to correct the issues identified. For instance, the Mid Atlantic Area vice president informed OIG that crisis management plans have been distributed to all installation heads along with information on the purpose of the plan and its necessity. Also, the Honolulu District stated that all installations have been provided a standard plan and a crisis number at the Honolulu processing center.

We believe the districts' planned and implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in our reports.

---

Corrective Actions by  
Management at Postal  
Service Headquarters

To address workplace environment issues, the Postal Service commissioned a study to examine all aspects of workplace violence in Postal Service facilities. The report prepared by the United States Postal Service Commission for a Safe and Secure Workplace made several recommendations to improve the threat assessment and crisis management teams and the workplace environment.

In December 2000, the Office of Employee Resource Management established cross-functional teams, consisting of staff from headquarters, area offices, management

associations, and the labor unions, to develop tasks to implement the report's recommendations. The senior vice president of Human Resource Management revised the Threat Assessment Team Guide and accompanying training materials that identified the elements of the violence prevention and response programs that must be followed. Orientation and training of threat assessment team members have been scheduled and the workplace environment improvement department will maintain an annual record of training. Beginning in 1999, all employees were required to have 4 hours of workplace environment improvement training and attendance will be tracked locally and by the workplace environment improvement department. In addition, the Inspection Service continues to work on the issue of accountability for security reviews.

## APPENDIX A. AUDIT REPORTS

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Mississippi District  
(LB-AR-00-004, September 29, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the South Georgia District  
(LB-AR-00-005, September 29, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the South Florida District  
(LB-AR-00-006, September 29, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the North Florida District  
(LB-AR-00-007, September 29, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Central Florida District  
(LB-AR-00-008, September 29, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Atlanta District  
(LB-AR-00-009, September 29, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Honolulu District  
(LB-AR-01-001, December 11, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the San Jose District  
(LB-AR-01-002, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Santa Ana District  
(LB-AR-01-003, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Sacramento District  
(LB-AR-01-004, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Long Beach District  
(LB-AR-01-005, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Van Nuys District  
(LB-AR-01-006, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Mid-Carolinas District  
(LB-AR-01-007, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Richmond District  
(LB-AR-01-008, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Greater South Carolina District (LB-AR-01-009, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Greensboro District (LB-AR-01-010, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Kentuckiana District (LB-AR-01-011, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Appalachian District (LB-AR-01-012, November 22, 2000)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Portland District (LB-AR-01-015, March 29, 2001)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Las Vegas District (LB-AR-01-016, March 30, 2001)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Spokane District (LC-AR-01-001, March 29, 2001)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Alaska District (LC-AR-01-002, March 29, 2001)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Big Sky District (LC-AR-01-003, March 29, 2001)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Colorado/Wyoming District (LC-AR-01-005, March 30, 2001)

Review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Arizona District (LC-AR-01-006, March 30, 2001)

## APPENDIX B. MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS

SUZANNE F. MEDVIDOVICH  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
HUMAN RESOURCES



July 25, 2001

JOYCE HANSON

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Draft Audit Report – National Capping Report on the Postal Service  
Violence Prevention and Response Programs  
(Report Number LB-AR-01-DRAFT)

This represents an update and clarification of the responses from Human Resources to the report recommendations.

The cross-functional teams referenced on pages 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11 of the report were assembled in December 2000 to address the recommendations resulting from the commissioned study on workplace violence. The final study report is internally referred to as the "Califano Report." The report resulted in 12 recommendations. The "Califano Report Implementation Program" administered by Workplace Environment Improvement (WEI) identifies more than 40 multi-functional tasks that address the 12 recommendations.

The following areas of the OIG report are addressed in the Califano Implementation Plan.

**Update of the Threat Assessment Team (TAT) Guide and accompanying training materials.**

The proposed changes in the guide are complete and include an emphasis on mandatory teams and training. Climate indicators, case management, and performance measures are also addressed. WEI recently requested an updated list of team members from all districts. All but five have responded to date. WEI will request this information annually beginning again in October 2001. The accompanying training materials are being revised to reflect changes in the guide to include updated statistics as available. The guide and training materials will be reviewed annually. Updates in the form of supplements will be issued as needed. Completion date is September 2001. (OIG report reference pg. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 12)

**Orientation and training of TAT members.**

WEI assisted in the scheduling of train-the-trainer programs. They have been scheduled for the two areas requiring new trainers. All other areas have scheduled training for new teams as required. An annual record of training, along with the membership list, will be maintained by WEI. Completion date is October 2001. (OIG report reference pg. 8)

**Physical security reviews.**

A new video on facility security, *Be Wise*, created by the New York Metro Area was partially funded by WEI. It is available through the distribution center. The Inspection Service and Human Resources have endorsed the video for use as part of the 4-hour requirement for Workplace Environment Improvement training in 2002. In addition, the Inspection Service has a workplace security poster campaign that was recently released to encourage everyone to be observant of people entering facilities and to report security deficiencies. The Inspection Service continues to work on the issue of accountability for security reviews. Completion date: October 2001. (OIG report reference pg. 5 and 6)

475 L'ENFANT PLAZA SW  
WASHINGTON DC 20260-4000  
202-268-4000  
FAX: 202-268-4009  
www.usps.com

- 2 -

**Workplace Environment Improvement Training.**

The TAT guide requires that managers and supervisors receive 8 hours of workplace violence awareness training with 4 hours of follow-up training. Beginning in 1999, all employees are required to have 4 hours of WEI training. This requirement should be viewed as sufficient to meet the 4-hour follow-up training. This requirement remains a part of the 20 hour (EAS) and 8 hour (craft) training requirement for all employees for 2002. One hour specifically devoted to violence awareness has been identified for all employees for FY2002. EAS employees will view a video with questions and craft will receive 12 specifically targeted 5-minute talks. The video will be distributed in early August. The talks will be available on the Web. More than 50 hours of training suggestions have been distributed to the field. The WEI department will make clear the connection between the follow-up 4 hours and the requirement for 4 hours each year for managers and supervisors. Completion of the 4-hour training requirement is tracked locally. The WEI department will annually track completion as well. Completion date: ongoing. (OIG report reference p. 10 and 11)



Suzanne F. Medvidovich

