

September 29, 2000

WILLIAM J. BROWN  
VICE PRESIDENT, SOUTHEAST AREA OPERATIONS

ANDERSON HODGES, JR.  
DISTRICT MANAGER, ATLANTA DISTRICT

SUBJECT: Audit Report - Review of the Violence Prevention and Response  
Programs in the Atlanta District (Report Number LB-AR-00-009)

This report presents the results of our review of the violence prevention and response programs in the Atlanta District (Project Number 99EA007ER0003). We engaged a contractor, Williams, Adley & Company, LLP, to assist us in conducting the audit. This audit report is one of a series of reports on violence prevention and response efforts within the Postal Service.

On the basis of our review, we concluded that required controls were not fully implemented to reduce the potential for violence in the Atlanta District and the district's ability to respond to crisis situations could be improved. Although the district generally complied with the Threat Assessment Team Guide when reacting to incidents of violence, and also complied with some of the policies and procedures in the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace, it did not comply with other violence prevention requirements. Although the vice president for the Southeast Area did not agree with our overall conclusions, we believe the district's planned or implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in this report. Therefore, we will not pursue resolution on this disagreement at this time. Management's comment and our evaluation of their comments are included in the report.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff during the review. If you have any questions, please contact Joyce Hansen, director, Labor Management-Rosslyn at (703) 248-2300.

Debra D. Pettitt  
Acting Assistant Inspector General  
for Oversight and Business Evaluations

Attachment

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Introduction

This report presents the results of our review of violence prevention and response efforts within the Atlanta District, located in the Southeast Area. The Atlanta District was one of six districts randomly selected from the nine districts within the Southeast Area.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) engaged a contractor, Williams, Adley, & Company, LLP, to conduct fieldwork and data analysis, prepare working papers, and draft reports. The OIG provided technical support, statistical projections, and quality assurance reviews. The OIG and the contractor prepared the final report.

Our objective was to determine whether the Atlanta District implemented Postal Service policies regarding violence prevention and response programs.

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### Results in Brief

On the basis of the review, we concluded that required controls were not fully implemented to reduce the potential for violence in the Atlanta District. The district generally complied with the Threat Assessment Team Guide when reacting to incidents of violence. The district:

- Developed and enforced a zero tolerance policy.
- Established Threat Assessment and Crisis Management Teams.
- Provided initial team orientation training.

The district also complied with some of the policies and procedures outlined in the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace.

However, we found that although the district appointed officials to serve on its Threat Assessment Team in March 1998, the team did not begin implementing the Threat Assessment Team Guide policies and procedures until August 1999. Also, the district did not fully implement required proactive strategies designed to prevent violence from occurring, as required by the guide. Officials told us the team did not adhere to all the established policies and procedures because they did not believe the policies and

procedures were mandatory requirements. As a result, required controls were not fully implemented to reduce the potential for violence in the workplace.

Our audit disclosed the Atlanta District did not:

- Conduct annual physical security reviews.
- Monitor and evaluate climate indicators.
- Engage in case management.
- Measure team performance.
- Mandate violence awareness training.

In addition, the district did not ensure receipt of local, customized crisis management plans at all facilities in accordance with the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace. We used a statistical sample to project that as many as 318 (89 percent) of the 358 Atlanta District facilities did not have a copy of their local, customized plan on site. (See Appendices B and C.)

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**Summary of  
Recommendations**

We recommended the vice president, Southeast Area Operations, direct the Atlanta District manager to implement six recommendations designed to ensure controls are implemented to improve the effectiveness of the district's violence prevention and response programs.

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**Summary of  
Management's  
Comments**

The vice president Southeast Area Operations observed that the OIG report focused on the condition of the violence awareness programs in fiscal year (FY) 1997 and 1998. He stated that because the OIG based its August 2000 conclusions on data obtained before June 1999 (the majority of which is FY 1997 and FY 1998), the conclusions are somewhat misleading. The vice president emphasized that the Southeast Area remains committed to the continuous improvement of the violence prevention and response programs and that instructions would be issued to district managers to reinforce the need to implement the controls necessary to improve the effectiveness of the programs.

The Atlanta District manager accepted our conclusions and recommendations as to where the Atlanta district was overall at the time of the review, stating that "great strides" had been made in strengthening and improving programs

since the review. He provided a list of actions planned or taken to insure compliance with the recommendations.

We have summarized management's comments in the report and included the full text of the comments in Appendix E.

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**Overall Evaluation of  
Management's  
Comments**

While we disagree that the OIG report was misleading and focused on the condition of the violence awareness programs in FY 1997 and 1998, using data from those fiscal years was necessary because they were the latest complete fiscal years at the time of our visit. However, interviews with postal officials regarding their implementation of proactive strategies occurred in September 1999.

Although the vice president for the Southeast Area did not agree with our overall conclusions, we believe the district's planned or implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in this report.

## INTRODUCTION

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### Background

The Postal Service recognizes the importance of ensuring the safety of its employees by creating and maintaining a work environment that is violence-free. This concept emphasizes using a viable workplace violence prevention program as the first step in helping to ensure a violence-free workplace. An effective program depends on a universal zero tolerance policy and a zero tolerance action plan that is consistently implemented for the management of threats, assaults, and other inappropriate workplace behavior.

The Postal Service established the following initiatives and strategies to prevent and minimize the potential risk for violence in the workplace:

- The Joint Statement on Violence and Behavior in the Workplace states the Postal Service's position that violent and inappropriate behavior will not be tolerated by anyone at any level of the Postal Service.
- The Threat Assessment Team Guide, Publication 108, and the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace, Publication 107,<sup>1</sup> require districts to develop appropriate threat assessment and crisis management teams, as well as team plans of operation.
- The Administrative Support Manual requires security control officers or their designees to conduct annual physical security reviews at all facilities.

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### Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to determine whether the Atlanta District implemented Postal Service policies regarding violence prevention and response programs.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) engaged a contractor to conduct fieldwork and data analysis, prepare working papers, and draft reports. The OIG provided technical support, statistical projections, and quality assurance reviews. The OIG and the contractor prepared the final report. (See Appendix A for complete Objective, Scope, and Methodology details.)

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<sup>1</sup> The Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace is under revision.

## AUDIT RESULTS

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### Potential for Violence in the District

On the basis of the review, we concluded that required controls were not fully implemented to reduce the potential for violence in the Atlanta District and the district's ability to respond to crisis situations could be improved. Although the district generally complied with the Threat Assessment Team Guide when reacting to incidents of violence and also complied with some of the policies and procedures in the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace, it did not comply with other violence prevention requirements.

Districts that do not comply with these requirements face an increased risk for violence in their facilities. Such violence increases stress, inflicts emotional wounds, and lowers employee morale. Organizationally, it diminishes credibility, decreases productivity, creates work-specific tension, and may lead to damage of property.

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### Implementation of Violence Prevention and Response Programs

The Atlanta District generally complied with the Threat Assessment Team Guide when reacting to incidents of violence. The district:

- Developed and enforced a zero tolerance policy.
- Established Threat Assessment and Crisis Management Teams.
- Provided initial team orientation training.

The district also complied with some of the policies and procedures outlined in the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace.

However, we found that although the district appointed officials to serve on its Threat Assessment Team in March 1998, the team did not begin implementing the Threat Assessment Team Guide policies and procedures until August 1999. Also, the district did not fully implement required proactive strategies designed to prevent violence from occurring, as required by the guide. Officials told us the team did not adhere to all the established policies and procedures because they did not believe the policies and procedures were mandatory requirements. As a result,

required controls were not fully implemented to reduce the potential for violence in the workplace.

Our audit disclosed the Atlanta District did not:

- Conduct annual physical security reviews.
- Monitor and evaluate climate indicators.
- Engage in case management.
- Measure team performance.
- Mandate violence awareness training.

In addition, the district did not ensure receipt of local, customized crisis management plans at all facilities in accordance with the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace. We used a statistical sample to project that as many as 318 (89 percent) of the 358 Atlantic District facilities did not have a copy of their local, customized plan on site. (See Appendices B and C.)

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Physical Security  
Reviews

The district did not conduct annual physical security reviews at all facilities as mandated by the Postal Service Administrative Support Manual. District officials told us training on how to conduct the reviews had not been provided to officials at all the district's facilities.

The Postal Service Administrative Support Manual, Chapter 2, Section 27, requires the security control officer or designee to conduct annual physical security reviews at all Postal Service facilities to ensure that the appropriate attention is given to security issues.<sup>2</sup>

We used a statistical sample to project that the Atlanta District conducted no more than 59 (16 percent) of the 358 required annual physical security reviews in FY 1997. In FY 1998, the district conducted no more than 86 (24 percent) of the 358 required annual physical security reviews. (See Appendices B and C.)

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<sup>2</sup> The chief postal inspector is designated as the security officer for the Postal Service. The security control officers located at each postal facility liaison with the Postal Inspection Service on all security matters.

The lack of physical security reviews at Postal Service facilities may increase the risk of workplace violence or the loss or destruction of Postal Service property and the mail.

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Climate Indicators

We found that the Atlanta District did not monitor and evaluate climate indicators as required by the Threat Assessment Team Guide. According to the Human Resources manager, the Atlanta District Threat Assessment Team does not have a formal process to monitor the workplace climate or events that may escalate the potential for violence in the workplace. As a result, controls associated with identifying and assessing indicators were not used to reduce the potential for violence in the workplace.


The guide outlines several climate indicators that are relevant for review when making such determinations. Among those indicators are grievances, Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, referrals to the Employee Assistance Program, and labor-management relationships.<sup>3</sup>

We reviewed several climate indicators that management could use as benchmarks to assess the workplace climate and identify locations that may require a climate assessment.


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<sup>3</sup> We considered the results of the Voice of the Employee surveys as an indicator of labor-management relationships.

**Grievances.** Exhibit 1 shows the Atlanta District had the fifth highest ratio (22:100) in the Southeast Area of step 3 grievance appeals to employees, for the period June 1, 1997, through June 30, 1999.<sup>4</sup>




For the same period, Exhibit 2 shows the district had the fifth highest ratio (17:100) of step 3 contract-related grievance appeals to employees.




<sup>4</sup> In a report entitled, "U.S. Postal Service: Little Progress Made in Addressing Persistent Labor-Management Problems," October 1997, GAO/GGD-98-1, GAO reported that a ratio of 13:100 grievances to employees was a high ratio. Union and management officials did not dispute this claim.


The district had one of the third highest ratios (5:100) of step 3 discipline-related grievance appeals to employees, for the same period, as shown in Exhibit 3.



**Equal Employment Opportunity Complaints.** Exhibit 4 shows that during the period June 1, 1997, to June 30, 1999, the district had the second lowest ratio (1:31) of Equal Employment Opportunity formal complaints to employees, in the Southeast Area.




**Employee Assistance Program Cases.** For the same period, the district had the second lowest ratio (1:12) of total pre-case activity<sup>5</sup> Employee Assistance Program cases per employee as depicted in Exhibit 5.




<sup>5</sup> The total pre-case activity contacts include all employees, family members, or supervisors who made contact with the Employee Assistance Program either by telephone or in-person to set up an appointment with an Employee Assistance Program counselor.

**Voice of the Employee Survey Results.** A majority of employees who responded to the Voice of the Employee survey<sup>6</sup> in the Atlanta District were generally satisfied with their work environment. As shown in Exhibits 6 and 7, the number of employees who responded favorably to their workplace environment ranged from 48 percent for Quarter 4 of 1998, to about 51 percent in Quarters 1, 2 and 3 of 1999. The number of employees who responded unfavorably to their workplace environment, ranged from 29 percent in Quarter 4, 1998, to about 26 percent in Quarters 1, 2 and 3, 1999. In addition, about 22 percent of the employees, who responded for the same quarters, remained neutral.



<sup>6</sup> The Voice of the Employee survey is a data collection instrument that the Postal Service has established to help improve workplace relationships and ensure that all employees are treated with fairness, feel safe in their workplace, have opportunities to participate and take pride in being postal employees.



While these indicators cannot be used as the sole basis for reaching conclusions concerning the district's workplace environment, the Threat Assessment Team can use them to assess the potential for violence in the district.

**Climate Assessments.** The Atlanta District conducted two climate assessments during our audit period. However, the assessments were not a result of the district's evaluation of any of the climate indicators discussed earlier. The district's Human Resources manager told us the district conducted climate assessments based on requests made by managers in the district. He told us the Atlanta District Threat Assessment Team does not have a formal process to monitor the workplace climate or events that may escalate the potential for violence in the workplace. Routine analysis of climate indicators may have identified the need for climate assessments at these sites before problems occurred.

For example, the plant manager requested a work climate assessment in April 1997 at a processing and distribution center. A new supervisor instituted operational changes at the facility, which negatively impacted employee morale. Although the assessment found no imminent danger to supervisors, employees, or in the workplace, there were significant indications suggesting the need for a proactive plan of action. The action plan included remedial training in

communications and interpersonal skill building for the supervisor, and a six-month period of monitoring the worksite.

In addition, the district's Employee Assistance Program counselors conducted a work climate assessment in June 1998 at a post office. The Employee and Workplace Intervention Analyst requested the assessment due to conflicts between a supervisor and craft employees. The assessment found no imminent threats of violence present in the workplace. The counselors recommended open and honest discussions between managers and all employees concerning the dangers of violent behavior.

The district could improve its process for evaluating the workplace climate by proactively identifying and monitoring sites or situations that have the potential for violence. Reviewing the indicators on a periodic basis could provide valuable information about conflict in district facilities.

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Case Management

The Atlanta District Threat Assessment Team did not always follow up to ensure its recommendations for addressing threatening incidents and hostile work environments were implemented, as required by the Threat Assessment Team Guide. The district Human Resources manager told us that the district did not follow the guide because he did not believe it was mandatory. A district that does not follow up on risk abatement plans could contribute toward an unsafe workplace for employees.

The Threat Assessment Team Guide requires the threat assessment team engage in case management of threats, including developing a risk abatement plan and engaging in follow up. We found that the team did not always follow up to ensure its recommendations were implemented to resolve workplace issues. Our review of 36 cases showed that 20 did not receive follow-up review.

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Measurement of Threat  
Assessment Team  
Performance

The Atlanta District Threat Assessment Team did not establish performance measures as required by the Threat Assessment Team Guide because the team did not consider this as a mandatory requirement. According to the Employee and Workplace Intervention Analyst, the team is in the process of reviewing the guide to discuss what needs to be done to accomplish the measurement of team

performance in the future. Without performance measures, the team could not objectively measure the effect their violence prevention efforts had on workplace climate and operations.

Performance measures help reduce the risk of violence in the workplace because they provide objective information to management on baseline performance and measure the effect of the violence prevention program. Objective data can be obtained through the use of surveys, the numbers and types of threats and assaults, the tracking system, and post-incident analysis of each violent incident.

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Violence Awareness  
Training

The district did not provide workplace violence awareness training for all district managers, supervisors, and craft employees in accordance with the Threat Assessment Team Guide because district officials did not consider the training mandatory. Employees who have not received violence awareness training may not be effective in preventing violence in the workplace.

The Threat Assessment Team Guide states that every Postal Service manager and supervisor should complete eight hours of workplace violence awareness program training and four hours of follow up training. Training topics should include defusing a difficult situation, and providing effective supervision. In September 1998, Postal Service management mandated one hour of violence awareness training for all craft employees, supervisors, and managers.

The Atlanta District's workplace violence awareness training consisted of:

- An eight-hour workplace violence awareness training course for managers and supervisors.
- A condensed four-hour workplace violence awareness training course primarily for managers and supervisors.
- A one-hour video, or portions thereof, available to all employees.
- A team training of the threat assessment and crisis management teams.

- An introduction to workplace violence awareness for new employees.<sup>7</sup>
- Stand-up sessions on a recurring basis for all employees at the district's facilities.<sup>8</sup>
- Television displays concerning workplace violence shown at the facilities for viewing by all employees.

The Human Resources manager told us that craft employees located in the district facilities received some training during orientation, stand-up talks, video presentations, and from other Postal Service publications. However, he could not provide training records to support who attended and when the training occurred. In that regard, it is unknown which craft employees in the district, received violence awareness training. We projected that no more than 713 (6 percent) of the 12,615 craft employees in the Atlanta District received the required one-hour training course. (See Appendix D.)

According to the Human Resources manager, the district did not provide workplace violence awareness training for craft employees because it did not receive a mandate from Postal Service Headquarters that craft employees were to receive the training.

The Postal Service has recognized violence awareness training for supervisors, managers, and craft employees as a vital component in preventing violence in the workplace. This training is mandatory because employees need effective tools to recognize the warning signs of violence and possibly defuse difficult situations.

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Crisis Management  
Plans Available at  
Facilities

The Atlanta District did not ensure receipt of local, customized crisis management plans at all district facilities in accordance with the Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace. Officials at some of the district facilities stated they could not locate the plans.

We used a statistical sample to project that as many as 318 (89 percent) of the 358 facilities in the Atlanta District

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<sup>7</sup> We could not verify attendance at the orientation training because a record of attendees was not kept.

<sup>8</sup> We could not verify attendance at the stand-up sessions because a record of attendees was not kept.

did not have a copy of their local, customized plan on site.  
(See Appendices B and C.)

Facilities that do not have crisis management plans on site may not have the necessary information to manage a crisis through to a successful conclusion.

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**Recommendations**

We recommend the vice president, Southeast Area Operations, direct the Atlanta District manager to implement controls to improve the effectiveness of the violence prevention and response programs. Specifically:

1. Provide the appropriate training to security control officers.
2. Conduct annual physical security reviews at all district facilities.
3. Monitor and evaluate climate indicators to identify conflict that could lead to violence in the workplace.
4. Follow up on the implementation of all risk abatement plans for identified threats and hostile work environments.
5. Establish performance measures to gauge team performance.
6. Mandate attendance at violence awareness training for all supervisors, managers, and craft employees.
7. Ensure receipt of local, customized crisis management plans at all facilities.

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**Summary of  
Management's  
Comments**

The vice president Southeast Area Operations observed that the OIG report focused on the condition of the violence awareness programs in FY 1997 and 1998. He stated that because the OIG based its August 2000 conclusions on data obtained before June 1999 (the majority of which is FY 1997 and FY 1998), the conclusions are somewhat misleading. He added that the report does not reference any information/data during the past year (data pre-dates June 1999). For example, the vice president pointed out that the Southeast Area mandated the necessary Violence Awareness Training in September 1999 for FY 2000 and

that training has now been fully completed and documented. The vice president emphasized that the Southeast Area remains committed to the continuous improvement of the violence prevention and response programs and that instructions would be issued to district managers to reinforce the need to implement the controls necessary to improve the effectiveness of the programs.

The Atlanta District manager accepted our conclusions and recommendations as to where the Atlanta District was overall at the time of the review, stating that “great strides” had been made in strengthening and improving programs since the review. The district managers stated that security control officers have been trained, and that security reviews were conducted in May 1999 and June 2000. He also stated that the threat assessment team meets twice each accounting period and that workplace climate assessments are conducted based on indicators and/or referrals. Additionally, he noted that actions are in place to develop follow-up protocol for risk abatements, establish measurement of threat assessment team performance, conduct the mandated violence awareness training, and provide plants with customized crisis management plans.

We have summarized management’s comments in the report and included the full text of the comments in Appendix E.

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**Evaluation of  
Management’s  
Comments**

While we disagree that the OIG report was misleading and focused on the condition of the violence awareness programs in FY 1997 and 1998, using data from those fiscal years was necessary because they were the latest complete fiscal years at the time of our visit. However, interviews with postal officials regarding their implementation of proactive strategies occurred in September 1999. We do acknowledge that some time lapsed between the completion of our fieldwork and release of our draft report to management due to the application of this review at 24 other districts. Yet, we believe the report presents a fair portrayal of the district’s threat assessment program.

Although the vice president for the Southeast Area did not agree with our overall conclusions, we believe the district's planned or implemented actions are responsive to the recommendations and address the issues identified in this report.

## APPENDIX A. OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the contractor reviewed applicable laws, policies, procedures, climate assessments, and other documents, such as the Postal Inspection Service's Assault and Threats Incident Reports and investigative worksheets. The OIG and contractor also reviewed United States General Accounting Office (GAO) reports related to labor-management issues.

The OIG and contractor interviewed Postal Service officials in the Atlanta District, Southeast Area, and headquarters to obtain information about the Postal Service workplace environment, and the procedures and policies implemented to ensure a safe and violence-free workplace.

To determine the district's compliance with policies and procedures, the OIG and contractor reviewed the district's Threat Assessment Team activities, zero tolerance policy, and crisis management plan. The OIG and contractor compared the activities, policies, and plans to the Postal Service requirements for violence prevention and response strategies. The district's initiatives for addressing workplace environmental climate issues, including training programs on violence prevention and response, were also reviewed.

The OIG and contractor reviewed climate indicators outlined in the Threat Assessment Team Guide that may help the Threat Assessment Team develop preventive measures to moderate risk and liability. Those climate indicators were the numbers of employee grievances, Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, and Employee Assistance Program cases for all districts in the Southeast Area, including the Atlanta District, for the period of June 1, 1997, through June 30, 1999.<sup>9</sup> For the same period, the OIG and contractor reviewed the workplace climate assessments for the Atlanta District. The OIG and contractor also reviewed results from the 1998 and 1999 Voice of the Employee surveys conducted in the Atlanta District. We reviewed this data as indicators of conflict that could lead to violence in the Atlanta District. The OIG and contractor compared some of the indicators in the Atlanta District to the same indicators in other districts within the Southeast Area.<sup>10</sup>

For fiscal years (FY) 1997 and 1998, the OIG projected the number of facilities where district officials conducted annual physical security reviews, and maintained crisis management plans on site.<sup>11</sup> We used statistical sampling methodologies to determine these numbers. (See Appendices B and C.)

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<sup>9</sup> The OIG selected this audit period because Postal Service published the Threat Assessment Team Guide and Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace in May 1997.

<sup>10</sup> The OIG obtained this data from the Postal Service databases but did not verify the accuracy of the data.

<sup>11</sup> The OIG obtained this data from the Postal Service database. We did not verify the accuracy of the data, however, the audit team made every effort to include only sites that fell under Postal Service violence prevention and threat assessment guidelines. The team effort, therefore, included removing locations such as contractor-only facilities, parking lots, land, and antenna sites from the data provided, to arrive at the facility population size.

For the period June 1, 1997, through June 30, 1999, the OIG projected the number of craft employees, supervisors, and managers who received the required number of hours of workplace violence awareness training. We used statistical sampling methodologies to project these numbers.<sup>12</sup> (See Appendix D.)

The OIG and the contractor conducted the audit from September 1999 through September 2000, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as considered necessary under the circumstances. The OIG and contractor discussed the conclusions and observations with appropriate management officials and included their comments where appropriate.

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<sup>12</sup> See footnote number 10.

## APPENDIX B

# STATISTICAL SAMPLING AND PROJECTIONS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY REVIEWS AND THE EXISTENCE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR FACILITIES IN THE ATLANTA DISTRICT FISCAL YEARS 1997 AND 1998

### Purpose of the Sampling

One of the objectives of this audit was to assess the Atlanta District's implementation of Postal Service policy regarding physical security reviews and crisis management plans. In support of this objective, the audit team employed a simple random attribute sample design that allows statistical projection of responses from individual facilities within the Atlanta District.

### Definition of the Audit Universe

The audit universe consisted of 358 facilities, such as post offices, stations, branches, postal stores, and processing and distribution centers. The Atlanta District management was the source of the universe data. The audit team made every effort to clean the database to include only sites that fell under Postal Service violence prevention and threat assessment guidelines. The team effort, therefore, included removing locations such as contractor-only facilities, parking lots, land, and antenna sites from the data provided, to arrive at the above-stated 358-facility population size.

### Sample Design and Modifications

The audit used a simple random sample design. We randomly selected 35 facilities for review. This sample size was planned to select facilities at the second stage of a two-stage design and was, therefore, not designed to provide a predetermined level of precision for an individual district projection. In changing to district-level projections, the audit team agreed to accept whatever level of precision derived from the existing sample size. Three separate attributes were included for the facility analysis.

### Statistical Projections of the Sample Data

All attributes are projected to the universe of 358 facilities. No differences in universe were provided for FY 1997 versus FY 1998.

### **Attribute 1: Physical Security Reviews Conducted In FY 1997**

Because of the low number of "positive" responses in the sample, this results set was analyzed using the hypergeometric adaptation of the binomial attribute table for controls testing, found in the General Accounting Office's Financial Audit Manual (the "FAM").

Because the population size is small (N=358), the tabulated values (for 95 percent reliability) are adjusted by the hypergeometric finite population correction,  $((N-n)/(N-1))^{0.5}$ .

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that no more than 59 (16 percent) of the Atlanta District facilities conducted a physical security review in FY 1997. The unbiased point estimate is 20 facilities. (Universe: 358)

### **Attribute 2: Physical Security Reviews Conducted In FY 1998**

The sample data were analyzed based on the estimation of a population proportion for a simple random sample as described in Elementary Survey Sampling, Scheaffer, Mendenhall, and Ott, c.1990.

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that no more than 86 (24 percent) of the Atlanta District facilities conducted a physical security review in FY 1998. The unbiased point estimate is 51 facilities. (Universe: 358)

### **Attribute 3: Crisis Management Plans On Site**

The sample data were analyzed based on the estimation of a population proportion for a simple random sample as described in Elementary Survey Sampling, Scheaffer, Mendenhall, and Ott, c.1990.

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that as many as 318 (89 percent) of the Atlanta District facilities did not have a copy of the district crisis management plan. The unbiased point estimate is 276 facilities without the crisis management plan. (Universe: 358)

**APPENDIX C**

**SAMPLE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS ON SITE  
AND PHYSICAL SECURITY REVIEWS CONDUCTED  
AT ATLANTA DISTRICT FACILITIES  
FISCAL YEARS 1997 AND 1998**

ITEM NO.	TYPE OF FACILITY	LOCATION	ZIP CODE	CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS ON SITE	PHYSICAL SECURITY REVIEWS CONDUCTED	
					FY 97	FY 98
1	Main Post Office	Siloam	30665	NO	NO	NO
2	Main Post Office	Smyrna	30080	YES	NO	NO
3	Main Post Office	Franklin Springs	30639	NO	NO	YES
4	Vehicle Maintenance Facility	Atlanta	30369	NO	NO	NO
5	Mail Processing Center	Duluth	30026	YES	NO	NO
6	Civic Center Station	Atlanta	30308	NO	NO	NO
7	Main Post Office	Palmetto	30268	NO	NO	NO
8	Main Post Office	Greenville	30222	NO	NO	NO
9	Main Post Office	Canon	30520	NO	NO	NO
10	Main Post Office	Forest Park	30297	NO	NO	NO
11	Main Post Office	Cumming	30040	NO	NO	NO
12	Main Post Office	Stone Mountain	30083	NO	NO	NO
13	Main Office, Additional Space	Tate	30177	YES	NO	NO
14	Peachtree City Branch	Fayetteville	30269	NO	NO	NO
15	Main Post Office	Pine Lake	30072	NO	NO	NO
16	Main Post Office	Adairsville	30103	NO	NO	NO
17	North Corners Station	Cartersville	30120	NO	YES	YES
18	North Atlanta Branch	Atlanta	30319	YES	NO	NO
19	Main Post Office	Grayson	30017	NO	NO	NO
20	Doraville Training Center	Atlanta	30340	NO	NO	NO
21	Howell Mill/Zone 27	Atlanta	30327	NO	NO	NO
22	Glenridge Branch	Atlanta	30342	NO	NO	NO
23	Concord Square	Smyrna	30080	YES	NO	NO
24	Main Post Office	Gillsville	30543	NO	NO	NO
25	Cumberland Branch Annex	Atlanta	30339	NO	NO	NO

Review of the Violence Prevention  
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LB-AR-00-009

ITEM NO.	TYPE OF FACILITY	LOCATION	ZIP CODE	CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS ON SITE	PHYSICAL SECURITY REVIEWS CONDUCTED	
					FY 97	FY 98
26	Crown Road Vehicle Maintenance Facility	Atlanta	30304	NO	NO	NO
27	Athens Square Mail	Athens	30606	NO	NO	NO
28	Main Post Office	Hartwell	30643	YES	YES	YES
29	Broadview Exchange	Atlanta	30324	YES	NO	NO
30	Main Post Office	Milner	30257	NO	NO	YES
31	Main Post Office	Dawsonville	30534	NO	NO	YES
32	Facilities Service Office	Atlanta	30340	NO	NO	NO
33	Main Post Office	Aragon	30104	NO	NO	NO
34	Main Post Office	Shannon	30172	YES	NO	NO
35	Main Post Office	Brooks	30205	NO	NO	NO

## APPENDIX D

# STATISTICAL SAMPLING AND PROJECTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES TRAINED IN WORKPLACE VIOLENCE AWARENESS IN THE ATLANTA DISTRICT JUNE 1, 1997, TO JUNE 30, 1999

### Purpose of the Sampling

One of the objectives of this audit was to assess the Atlanta District's implementation of Postal Service policy to train supervisors/managers and craft employees in conflict resolution and workplace violence awareness. In support of this objective, the audit team conducted statistical samples of personnel from each of the two groups. A simple random attribute sample design was used in both cases.

### Definition of the Audit Universe

For the craft employee assessment, the audit universe consisted of 12,615 craft employees in the Atlanta District. For the supervisory-level assessment, the audit universe was a total of 1,087 supervisors and managers in the district.

All training information came from the personnel database in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

### Sample Design and Modifications

The audit used a simple random sample design. We randomly selected 50 craft employees and 50 managers and supervisors for review. This sample size was planned to select employees at the second stage of a two-stage design and was, therefore, not designed to provide a predetermined level of precision for an individual district projection. In changing to district-level projections, the audit team agreed to accept whatever level of precision derived from the existing sample size. Three separate attributes were included for the supervisory-level training analysis.

### Statistical Projections of the Sample Data

In general, the sample data were analyzed based on the estimation of a population proportion for a simple random sample as described in Elementary Survey Sampling, Scheaffer, Mendenhall, and Ott, c.1990.

In some cases, a low number of "positive" responses in the sample required analysis using the hypergeometric adaptation of the binomial attribute table for controls testing, found in the General Accounting Office's Financial Audit Manual (the "FAM"). The tabulated values (for 95 percent reliability) are adjusted by the hypergeometric finite population correction,  $((N-n)/(N-1))^{0.5}$ .

Results are presented for a one-sided confidence interval as well as the point estimate. For the collection of supervisory attributes, the sum of the point estimates will equal the total population. A sum of the upper bounds is meaningless because any increases in one category would be offset by reductions in another.

### **Craft Employee Training Projection**

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that no more than 743 (6 percent) of the 12,615 craft employees in the Atlanta District received training in workplace violence awareness. The unbiased point estimate is zero employees who met the training criterion.

### **Supervisors and Managers: Training Projection**

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that up to 443 (41 percent) of the 1,087 Atlanta District supervisors and managers received no workplace violence awareness training. The unbiased point estimate is 30 percent, or 326 supervisors and managers, who received no subject-matter training.

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that up to 838 (77 percent) of the 1,087 Atlanta District supervisors and managers received some subject-matter training, possibly as part of other supervisory courses ranging from 1 to 60 hours. The unbiased point estimate is 66 percent, or 717 supervisors and managers.

Based on a projection of the sample results, we are 95 percent confident that no more than 130 (12 percent) of the 1,087 Atlanta District supervisors and managers met or exceeded the 12-hour subject-matter training criterion. The unbiased point estimate is that 4 percent, or 43 supervisors and managers, met the 12-hour training criterion.

## APPENDIX E. MANAGEMENT'S COMMENTS

WALTER J. BROWN  
VICE PRESIDENT, AREA OPERATIONS  
SOUTHEAST AREA



September 18, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Debra D. Pettitt  
Acting Assistant Inspector General  
For Oversight and Business Evaluation  
Office of Inspector General  
1735 N. Lynn Street  
Arlington, VA 22209-2020

SUBJECT: Audit Reports-Review of Violence Prevention and Response  
Programs in the South Georgia District, North Florida District,  
Atlanta District, South Florida District, and Mississippi District  
(Report # LB-AR-00-DRAFT)

This is a response to the five draft reports concerning the Reviews of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs in the Districts listed above, dated August 18, 2000, and received in the Southeast Area Office on August 28, 2000.

Each relevant District Manager will appropriately provide the specific management response to the District recommendations under separate cover. This response will address the recommendations in all five reports that the Area Vice President directs the above five District Managers to implement controls to improve the effectiveness of the violence prevention and response programs.

Again, I will reiterate the observation that the draft report focused on the condition of the Violence Awareness Programs in FY 97 and FY 98. To draw conclusions in August 2000, based on data that pre-dates June 1999 (the majority of which is FY 97 and FY 98), is somewhat misleading. For instance, the Southeast Area mandated the necessary Violence Awareness Training in September 1999 for FY 2000; that training has now been fully completed (records available in the National Training Database (NTD)). Also, the Southeast Area issued instructions in March 1999 for completion of the required security reviews in accordance with the ASM (completion records available from Area SCO). However, the report does not reference any information/data during the past year (data pre-dates June 1999).

The Southeast Area, however, remains committed to the continuous improvement of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs. Therefore, instructions will be issued to District Managers to reinforce the need to implement the controls necessary to improve the effectiveness of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs (copy attached).

255 N. ...  
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If you require any additional information, please contact Karen Borowski, Manager, Human Resources, at 901-747-7200.



William J. Brown

Attachment

cc: District Managers: Atlanta, North Florida, South Florida, Mississippi, South Georgia  
Yvonne Maguire, Vice President, Employee Resource Management, HQs  
Suzanne Milton, Manager, Workplace Environment Improvement, HQs

Review of the Violence Prevention  
and Response Programs in the Atlanta District

LB-AR-00-009

WILLIAM J. BROWN  
VICE PRESIDENT, AREA OPERATIONS  
SOUTHEAST AREA



September 18, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: District Managers  
SUBJECT: Violence Prevention and Response Programs

Recent audits by the Office of the Inspector General have revealed the need to improve our Violence Prevention and Response Programs. In an effort toward continuous improvement in this critical area, please take the necessary action to assure the following controls are in place in your cluster to improve our program effectiveness:

- Verify that the FY 2000 mandated Violence Awareness Training has occurred.
- Assure the required two-day orientation training is provided to all Threat Assessment Team (TAT) members.
- Verify that the necessary annual Security Reviews are conducted in accordance with the provisions of the ASM.
- Effectively utilize relevant climate indicators as a means of assessing and reducing the potential for violence.
- Establish a monitoring mechanism to ensure receipt of local customized crisis management plans at all facilities.
- Assure implementation of the necessary TAT performance measures as described in Chapter 5, Publication 108, Threat Assessment Guide.
- Assure that TATs engage in appropriate case management in accordance with Chapter 4 of Publication 108, Threat Assessment Guide.

If we are to provide the "safest possible work environment" for all of our employees, it is imperative that we continuously monitor, evaluate, and improve our processes and procedures in the area of violence prevention and security. The Southeast Area remains committed to a proactive approach of violence prevention and effective emergency response programs.

  
William J. Brown

cc: Yvonne Maguire, Vice President, Employee Resource Management, HQs  
Suzanne Milton, Manager, Workplace Environment Improvement  
Managers, Human Resources (Districts)

255 N. WASHINGTON BLVD.  
MEMPHIS, TN 38103-0100  
901-747-7333  
FAX 901-747-7491

Review of the Violence Prevention  
and Response Programs in the Atlanta District

LB-AR-00-009

ATLANTA DISTRICT MANAGER  
CUSTOMER SERVICE AND SALES



September 15, 2000

Ms. Debra D. Pettitt  
Acting Assistant Inspector General  
Oversight and Business Evaluations  
1735 N. Lynn Street  
Arlington, VA 22209-2020

Dear Ms. Pettitt:

We accept your conclusions and recommendations as to where Atlanta was overall at the time of your review of the Violence Prevention and Response Programs.

We believe great strides have been made in strengthening and improving of programs since the review.

Attached you will find actions being and/or already taken to insure compliance with your recommendations.

Sincerely,



Anderson Hodges, Jr.

cc: William J. Brown  
Vice President  
Southeast Area Operations

Karen Borowski  
Manager, Human Resources  
Southeast Area

J. T. Middlebrooks  
Manager, Human Resources  
Atlanta District

□

P. O. Box 599300  
NORTH METRO, GA 30159-9300

□

**Provide the Appropriate Training to Security Control Officers**

Security Control Officers Steve Engle and Michael Frey received SCO training. Mr. Engle was trained January 1996 and Mr. Frey completed SCO training in April 1999. Training records can be accessed at the National Training Database.

**Conduct Annual Security Reviews**

Security reviews were conducted May 1999 and June 2000. Ninety-nine percent of all surveys for 2000 have been completed. All surveys will be completed by the end of A/P 1 and will be monitored by the Security Review Committee at quarterly meetings

**Monitor and Evaluate Climate Indicators**

Currently conducting TAT (Threat Assessment Team) meetings twice each Accounting Period to review alleged threats and hostile workplace behaviors. We are also conducting workplace climate assessments based on indicators and/or referrals. District will implement the following:

Realign TAT program in accordance with Publication 108 by AP 2.

Review indicators during TAT meetings, i.e., VOE survey results, grievances, EEOs, SL, OT, complaints, and formal EEO referrals. In addition, review Inspection Service "Threats" report, absenteeism rates; and Injury Compensation and Safety stats.

Use the employee survey results in Level 21 and above offices to create action plans for improved employee labor climates starting AP 2.

**Risk Abatement**

The District is currently developing follow-up protocol to be completed during AP 2, a 30/60/90 day follow-up review will be implemented by the end of AP 2 and we will employ additional intervention if necessary upon review of those progress reports.

**Measurement of Threat Assessment Team Performance**

The TAT has an established tracking system that monitors resolutions. In addition, the TAT is working in collaboration with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service utilizing their tracking system. We will utilize the sample Threat Assessment Team Survey guidelines that are part of Publication 108, Threat Assessment Team Guide. We will also conduct self-assessments using feedback from TAT surveys, clients, and TAT members attending TAT meetings. (NLT Qtr II)

**Mandate Violence Awareness Training**

During FY 2000, we conducted eight hours Workplace Violence Awareness Training for all supervisors and managers and craft employees were provided one-hour Workplace Violence Training. In addition, Workplace Violence Training is presented to all new employees during orientation. Candidates in the Associate Supervisor Program (ASP) receive eight-hour classroom training. We also conducted stand-up sessions on a recurring basis for all employees. Workplace Violence Awareness training for all craft pay locations and EAS employees is recorded in the National Training Database (NTD).

**Ensure Receipt of Customized Crisis Management Plans**

All plants have been issued Crisis Management Plan (Emergency Response Procedures at a Glance). Crisis Management Plan (Emergency Response at a Glance) will be re-distributed to Atlanta Post Offices and the Associate Offices NLT the end of AP 3 via certified mail with signed receipts from managers verifying receipt of Crisis Management Plans.